

## **Handout**

1)

Drawing on the distinction between logical judgements and the judgements of taste, Kant states that in the latter case 'no concept of the object' can be 'the ground of judgment'. The ground

can consist only in the subsumption of the imagination itself (in the case of a representation by means of which an object is given) *under the condition that the understanding in general advance from intuitions to concepts*. I.e., since the freedom of the imagination consists precisely in the fact that it schematizes without a concept, the judgment of taste must rest on a mere sensation of the reciprocally animating imagination in its **freedom** and the understanding with its **lawfulness**, thus on a feeling that allows the object to be judged in accordance with the purposiveness of the representation (by means of which an object is given) for the promotion of the faculty of cognition in its free play; and taste, as a subjective power of judgment, contains a principle of subsumption, not of intuitions under **concepts**, but of the **faculty** of intuitions or presentations (i.e., of the imagination) under the **faculty** of concepts (i.e., the understanding), insofar as the former **in its freedom** is in harmony with the latter **in its lawfulness**. (*KU*, 5: 287, italics mine).

2)

Yves Klein, *ANT 104, ANTHROPOMÉTRIE SANS TITRE* (1960). Dry pigment in synthetic resin on paper (mounted on canvas), 278 x 410 cm:  
<https://www.fondationlouisvuitton.fr/en/collection/artworks/ant-104-anthropometrie-sans-titre>.



3)

In the *General Remark* following § 22, Kant writes that

[...] everything flows from the concept of taste as a faculty for judging an object in relation to the **free lawfulness** of the imagination. But if in the judgment of taste the imagination must be

considered in its freedom, then it is in the first instance taken not as reproductive, as subjected to the laws of association, but as productive and self-active (as the authoress of voluntary forms of possible intuitions); and although in the apprehension of a given object of the senses it is of course bound to a determinate form of this object and to this extent has no free play (as in invention), nevertheless it is still quite conceivable that the object can provide it with a form that contains precisely such a composition of the manifold as the imagination would design in harmony with the **lawfulness of the understanding** in general if it were left free by itself. Yet for the **imagination to be free and yet lawful by itself**, i.e., that it carries autonomy with it, is a contradiction. *The understanding alone gives the law.* [...] Thus only a lawfulness without law and a subjective correspondence of the imagination to the understanding *without an objective one* – where the representation is related to a determinate concept of an object – are consistent with *the free lawfulness of the understanding* (which is also called purposiveness without an end) and with the peculiarity of a judgment of taste. (*KU*, 5: 240-241, italics mine).

4)

Consider the following quotations from the third *Critique*:

[...] the judgment of taste is not determinable by means of concepts, it is grounded only on the subjective formal condition of a judgment in general. *The subjective condition of all judgment is the faculty for judging itself*, or the power of judgment. (*KU*, 5: 287, my emphasis).

How are judgments of taste possible? This problem thus concerns the *a priori* principles of the pure power of judgment in **aesthetic** judgments, i.e., in those where it does not (as in theoretical judgments) merely have to subsume under objective concepts of the understanding and stands under a law, but where it is itself, subjectively, *both object as well as law*. (*KU*, 5: 288, my emphasis).

5)

Pablo Picasso, *Bull*: Plates I-XI (1945-1946): <http://www.publicartinchicago.com/the-bull-by-pablo-picasso/>.

