

Conceptual and nonconceptual contents and the fate of imagination

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Abstract:

The faculty of imagination and its role in the *Critique of the Power of Judgement* present an important controversy on the conceptuality of aesthetic judgements, which also refers to cognitive claims in the *Critique of Pure Reason*. Different approaches, from analytic to continental traditions, from psychological readings of Kant to the advocates of philosophy of mind hold different views on conceptuality. This variety appears as a result of the status and role of the imagination and kinds of syntheses it realizes which differs in the first and the second editions of the *Critique of Pure Reason*. In the first edition, Kant presents imagination as one of the three fundamental faculties between sensibility and apperception, and as the agent of synthesis. However, in the second edition, he posits imagination as a sub-faculty of the understanding.

In this presentation, I will claim that the fate of the faculty of imagination and the fate of the nonconceptual/conceptual content debate are interconnected. I state that aesthetic experience is nonconceptual, and in order to support my claim I will start with the *Critique of Pure Reason* where Kant posits imagination as a central faculty. Then I will illustrate that the arguments about the nonconceptuality of aesthetic experience takes its ground from the first edition of the first *Critique*, which is interconnected to and more consistent with the *Critique of the Power of Judgment*.